The French and Belgian bans on face veils in public places have been subjected to strong substantive human rights critiques. This article takes a complementary approach, examining the bans from the perspective of procedural fairness. Indeed, the French and Belgian bans are extreme examples of legislative processes taking place above the heads of the people concerned, neglecting the ban's possible human rights impact. After exploring what the social psychology notion of procedural fairness entails for the judiciary and the legislator, especially in a multicultural context, this article details procedural fairness shortcomings with respect to the face veil ban in France and Belgium. Subsequently, the article sets out how the European Court of Human Rights might compensate for these shortcomings.
discriminations on grounds of religion and sex. 3 Complementing such substantive human rights critiques, this paper takes a different approach, examining the bans from the perspective of procedural fairness. Indeed, the French and Belgian bans are extreme examples of legislative processes taking place above the heads of the people concerned. Not only was the voice of the women concerned missing in the debates, even more striking was the fact that a discussion of the ban's human rights impact was nearly non-existent.
In a first section, we will refer to social psychology research to explain what procedural fairness encompasses and what it entails for both the judiciary and the legislator, particularly in a multicultural context. Next, we will demonstrate how the French and Belgian authorities have neglected procedural fairness at the domestic level. In the third section, we will argue how the European Court of Human Rights, if confronted with the subject matter, might restore procedural fairness.
Procedural Fairness and Minority Justice
Procedural fairness or procedural justice refers to the fairness of the procedures by which a decision is taken or by which an outcome is arrived at in a case. Social psychology research has shown that in their fairness assessment of authorities and the law, people tend to accord more importance to procedural fairness than to distributive justice. 4 In other words, the way people are treated by judges and authorities is more relevant to them than the particular outcome in their case or the policy decision taken. This does not mean however that the outcome is considered irrelevant. 5 Procedural fairness and distributive justice should be seen as mutually strengthening approaches rather than substitutes. 6
Importance of Procedural Fairness
Initially, procedural justice research focused on the question of compliance with the law. Tyler and his associates found that the legitimacy of an authority shapes compliance and that legitimacy is rooted in procedural fairness judgments. 7 Hence, the first reason for authorities to accord particular importance to procedural fairness is maintaining their own legitimacy and that of the law. Central to the idea of legitimacy is the belief that "some decision made or rule created by [the] authorities is 'valid' in the sense that it is 'entitled to be obeyed' by virtue of who made the decision or how it is made". 8 As a consequence, procedural fairness also enhances cooperation with authorities. 9 It can also be argued that when a human rights body such as the European Court of Human Rights is involved, the importance of procedural justice is even more important 'because it is part of the value system they represent' and because the legitimacy of human rights law is at stake. 10 Moreover, it promotes social cohesion and individual well being. Research has consistently shown that " [p] eople … value fair treatment by legal authorities because it communicates a message about their identities-that they are respected and valued members of society" 11 and that they can count on the authorities for protection, benevolence and consideration when needed. Although it follows from Tyler's research that procedural fairness is equally important to majority populations as to minorities 13 , there are several reasons to believe that procedural fairness is particularly crucial for minority justice.
Firstly, overcoming minority members' above-average distrust of authorities 14 may require particular vigilance on procedural fairness. 15 Secondly, perceptions of social standing in the society gain a special significance for minority members. When certain people, e.g. youth, minorities or people with disabilities are treated unfairly, authorities might be sending the signal that these groups are marginal in society. 16 In contrast, by treating minority individuals fairly the authorities convey a message of inclusion among the valued members of society.
Components of Procedural Fairness
Tyler and others highlight four criteria, according to which people evaluate procedural fairness:
participation, trustworthiness, neutrality and respect. . In Belgium too, the law was unsuccesfully challenged before the Constitutional Court, also with a minor reservation for places of worship.
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A closer look at the processes in both countries reveals serious shortcomings with respect to several procedural fairness requirements. 39 More specifically it concerned 136 ayes, 0 nays and 2 abstentions. 40 The majority of legislative proposals in Belgium are 'optionally bicameral'. Regarding such proposals, the governing principle is that the Chamber of Representatives has the authority to approve a bill autonomously but the Senate has the right to 'evoke' the approved bill and discuss it. This so-called 'right of evocation' must be invoked within a certain term and it requires a minimum number of members. 41 In the plenary Chamber, there were 129 ayes, 1 nay and 2 abstentions. 42 Belgian Constitutional Court, 6 December 2012, no. 145/2012.
Accuracy
Accuracy is an aspect of the neutrality of the law. 43 This means simply that the law has to be based on information that is correct. In this respect, both the Belgian and French 'burqa ban' laws are seriously flawed. Several commentators have noted that in the legislative process, no evidence was adduced that would allow to identify the exact problem the law would remedy, nor to support the claim that the specific remedy -i.e. the ban-would be effective with respect to that problem. 44 The
Belgian and French legislators were rather well tuned in with majority sentiments vis-à-vis the face
veil, yet they were working on erroneous assumptions concerning the profiles and experiences of women wearing the face veil. 45 The central error is the assumption that all -or nearly all-women who wear the face veil are forced or pressured to do so. lawmaking. Moreover, an expert testified before the Gerin commission that the wearing of the face veil in France was a matter of 'religious hyper-individualism' in which women choose to submit to a religious rule. 50 The finding that the assumption of coercion is wrong renders moot at least two of the arguments used by both legislators to justify the ban. The first is the argument based on women's rights. If women are not forced to wear the veil but instead freely choose to do so, the bans instead of liberating women, curtail their autonomy. Moreover they strengthen stereotypes about Muslim women's subordination. In both ways, the bans work against women's rights. The second is the argument about social integration. When donning the face veil is a well-considered choice, many women will not consider abandoning it as a first option when confronted with the ban. They prefer instead to continue wearing the veil yet avoid going out in public except by car. 51 For these women, the bans reduce social integration. Moreover, empirical research also questions the relevance of the third argument in the parliamentary debates, which is based on security concerns. It appears in fact that face veil wearers are generally willing to lift their veils for identity checks, in many cases even to male security personnel.
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The fact that the legislators literally had no idea what they were dealing with, 53 thus had important consequences for the impact of the ban. Disregarding essential evidence in the course of lawmaking is highly problematic; it is even more so when it concerns legislation restricting fundamental rights. In Belgium, the disregard seems deliberate, as Parliament insisted on moving fast, and in that spirit auditioned 211 persons and produced a 658 page report. Yet the same flaws occurred. One of the auditioned experts suggests that an erroneous presentation of reality may have been brought in through the analyses of some of his colleagues, as they were set on an ideological reading of the face veil and on interpreting it as a sign of domination and alienation of Muslim women. 54 Moreover neither the French Constitutional Council nor the Belgian Constitutional Court did anything to correct this flaw. 55 Both had the power and the opportunity to require the government to advance evidence as to its correct assessment of the problem the legislation sought to address, and of the ban's likelihood to remedy that problem. Yet, the French Council chose to only reiterate the legislator's assumptions that the face veil could endanger public security and the minimal requirements of living together and that women wearing a face veil, "whether voluntarily or not" are in a situation of exclusion and inferiority that is manifestly incompatible with the constitutional principles of liberty and equality.
56
The Belgian Constitutional Court did a slightly better job with regard to accuracy, acknowledging both that no security problem involving face covering occurred yet in Belgium
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, and that the face veil can be a manifestation of a well-considered choice 58 . Nevertheless it accepted the ban as necessary for security reasons as well as for reasons of gender equality. With regard to the former, the Court argued that the State was allowed to "anticipate" potential risks. 59 As to the gender argument, the Court stated that regardless of free choice, the principle of gender equality justifies a ban on religious manifestations that are not reconcilable with the principle of equality between men and women. 
Neutrality/Sincerity/Transparence
For lawmakers, the requirement of neutrality comes close to those of sincerity and transparence. It is about being clear on the purpose of the legislation, and seriously striving to best achieve that purpose. In the case of conflicting interests between different categories of people affected by the law, it is also about taking the interests of all categories equally seriously.
Both the French and Belgian laws ban face covering in general, even though the legal history and the accompanying discourse make clear that they target the Islamic face veil specifically. The neutral wording is intended chiefly to avoid legal challenges of discrimination on grounds of religion. Yet it goes at the expense of sincerity and transparence. Both the Belgian and French legislators have been accused of hypocrisy for disguising the real objective of the law. 62 The the information from the auditions by the Commission. It was noted that the final report erased the plurality of reasons explaining the practice of the face veil that were advanced at the Commission's hearings. 66 Moreover, it can be argued that parliamentarians interpreted the Gerin report in a selective and biased manner, as in addition to a ban, the report also proposed a number of positive measures related to sensitization, mediation, respect for diversity and the rejection of discrimination, none of which were taken up in the political work that followed the report. much more than a semi-political organ". 72 Similar reasoning has been applied to the Belgian Constitutional Court, half the bench of which are former politicians, making it unlikely that it would dare criticize a law adopted with near unanimity. 73 Although the Belgian Constitutional judges motivated their decision more thoroughly, the reasoning remained one-sided giving quasi-absolute weight to the State's arguments instead of balancing the interests of all the parties. 74
Participation
In the process of lawmaking, individuals cannot expect to be heard in person. 75 Yet individuals belonging to a group that is directly affected/targeted by a law have a legitimate expectation that their side of the story is somehow on the to the best solution for all; or that at least dialogue should have been tried before resorting to the criminal law. 78 Yet as shown above, the lawmakers were not really interested in information from the perspective of the face veil wearers. During the massive information gathering effort that was the French Gerin Commission, the idea of talking to a woman who wears the face veil came as an afterthought. Kenza Drider, the only face veil wearer who was heard by the Commission, states that she had written several letters to Mr. Gerin asking to appear before the Commission, and that she had to mobilize her media contacts in order to succeed. During her hearing, summarized in ten lines in the 658 page report, she had to unveil her face. 79 Moreover, the Gerin report starts with an 'avant-propos', in which a member of the commission relates the one encounter he had with a (French) woman wearing the face veil, which was on a professional trip to Syria. According to the text the woman approached him because she wanted to explain the meaning of her face veil. The melodramatic text describes the scene in much detail and concludes that "the eyes of Farah from Marseille" were a source of motivation for the commissioners. Yet it remains mute on the content of her message.
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This is symptomatic of the whole report, and by extension of the entire lawmaking process that took place: the perspective of the women concerned was systematically shoved off the table. 81 This is all the more remarkable given the fact that both Belgium and France have a strong tradition of consulting with target groups in the run-up to lawmaking. 82 The derogation from democratic custom in this specific case cannot go unnoticed, neither by the women themselves, nor by the population at large.
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van Sasse van Ysselt, "Over het verbod op het dragen van een gezichtssluier en van andere gelaatsbedekkende kleding", p.7. Gérin, "Rapport d'information fait en application de l'article 145 du règlement au nom de la mission d'information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le territoire national", p. 15-16; See Krivenko, "The Islamic Veil and its Discontents: How do they Undermine Gender Equality", p. 21.
Respect
Treating people with respect means taking them and their concerns seriously, and treating them as valued members of society. 83 Under this heading, at least three issues are cause of concern in the face veil banning process.
The first has been called "a neo-colonial form of paternalism". 84 The Belgian and French legislators claim to want to liberate women wearing a face veil, yet they are not interested in the viewpoints of these women. They pretend to know better than them why they wear what they wear. 85 Throughout their discourse, they picture these women as submitted, dependent creatures. The legislators thus deny these women autonomy. Moreover, the legislators dwell extensively on how the majority in society experience the encounter of a face veil or even the idea of a face veil, yet show no interest in knowing how women who wear it experience their encounters with others. They thus ignore the women behind the veil, denying them humanity.
In the second place, the legislators do not take seriously the infringement they are creating into a fundamental right, i.e. the freedom to express one's religion. They consistently downplay the religious factor, despite the fact that for most women who wear the face veil, the central reason for doing so is a deep religious commitment. Even more importantly, they go lightly about tampering with a fundamental right. This is evidenced most clearly in the blatant ignoring of the advice of the 92 The main purpose of the ban seems to be "to reassure public opinion that the political class is ready to stand up for 'our' values in the face of 'foreign' threats to 'our way of life'." coerced to do so, they apparently did not care enough about these women to punish the perpetrators. Manifestly the only problems the lawmakers cared about are those of the majority population.
An even more cynical interpretation is one that does not see any evidence of sincere caring by the lawmakers, except for their own electoral gain. Such is the suggestion among commentators who point at the fact that the bans enjoyed wide popular support, and that those supporting them politically would surf to similar popularity on waves of populism and islamophobia.
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At a more institutional level, the refusal of the Belgian lawmakers to hear experts or consult the Council of State, or the anti-discrimination watchdog, 96 or even to seriously engage with any arguments against the ban, 97 can be seen as evidence of lack of caring, in the sense that the focus on getting a ban voted, left no room for even the most common efforts aimed at doing things in a proper way. It was quite clear that the parliamentarians did not want to have to deal with criticism.
One of the main proponents of the ban explicitly stated that the reason for avoiding the Council of State was the fear that it might find inconsistencies with fundamental rights. In other words, in their hurry to get the ban voted, politicians did not even care about fundamental rights.
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In France, the Council of State was consulted, yet the picture does not look any rosier. The Council crushed the proposed ban on grounds of incompatibility with fundamental rights. Similarly, the legal experts heard by the Gerin commission had warned that a general ban would be highly problematic. 99 In an 'unprecedented defiance of concerted legal opinion' 100 however, the French parliament ignored these objections, and several MPs engaged in public court-bashing against the The Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism; cf. Delgrange, "Quand la burqa passé à l'Ouest, la Belgique perd-elle le Nord?", p. 35.
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Delgrange, "Quand la burqa passé à l'Ouest, la Belgique perd-elle le Nord?", pp. 25 and 33.
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Id., 5.
99
Hennette-Vauchez, "La burqa, la femme et l'Etat". Council of State, 101 signaling that if they cared about anything, it was not the rule of law or fundamental rights.
Doing Procedural Minority Justice in Strasbourg
As was to be expected, an application challenging the French face veil ban was brought before the European Court of Human rights. 102 This is an opportunity for the Court to set the standard on procedural justice as well as substantive justice. In the analysis below we will explore how the Court could potentially realize the former.
Assessing Domestic Procedural Fairness
Throughout its case-law, the European Court of Human Rights regularly acts as a watchdog of domestic procedural fairness. In this respect it has evaluated decision making processes by domestic courts, administrations and lawmakers. It is noteworthy that the Court has paid attention to this in cases involving the rights of members of ethnic or religious minorities, even when it exercised only light scrutiny.
In particular, in cases involving article 8 -the provision that protects a minority lifestyle, 103 as well as dealing with numerous issues of specific relevance for minorities, such as housing 104 
Doing it Right at the European Level
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Id., para. 120. In addition to setting the standard on domestic procedural fairness, we submit that the Court in its own work should strive for best practice in this field. This would both strengthen its credibility when criticizing domestic shortcomings and offer states parties concrete examples of procedural fairness in legal reasoning. Moreover, from applicants' perspective, fair treatment by this highest body in the hierarchy of law can offer some compensation for procedural unfairness suffered in earlier stages.
a) Recognizing the Applicant
The issue of voice is crucial for the European Court's treatment of the face veil case. As it examines the case from the starting point of the fundamental right at stake, the right holder's perspective comes natural to the Court. Throughout its reasoning, the Court should take care to present sufficient and accurate information on her experiences and to accurately present her arguments.
While the applicant's perspective is centerpiece, information on the experiences of other face veil wearers provides a relevant contextualization.
Assuming that the applicant in SAS v. France corresponds to the 'standard profile' of face veil wearers in France, it is to be expected that her religious conviction is a crucial aspect of the insider perspective. 114 The way a conviction is experienced and the importance accorded to it is subjective.
Outsiders may not understand why a Sikh objects to removing his turban at a security check or why it might not be evident for a Muslim girl to remove her headscarf during sports classes. Similarly, outsiders may not understand why a woman decides to cover her face when appearing in public. In determining whether or not such behaviour falls under the European Convention, it is however the insider perspective that counts. It is not for the Court to determine what a religion prescribes or does not prescribe. 115 Only the applicant-believer can autonomously decide this for herself. In most of its case law, the Court has adopted a correct approach to this matter: the relevant question is whether the applicant finds a particular practice important in the context of her religion or belief. 116 The ECtHR recently clarified in Eweida e.o. v. the UK that "the existence of a sufficiently close and direct nexus between the act and the underlying belief must be determined on the facts of each case. In particular, there is no requirement on the applicant to establish that he or she acted in fulfilment of a duty mandated by the religion in question". 117 Accordingly, the autonomy of the believer implies also that it does not matter whether the religious dictate she wants to follow consists of a minority view within her religious group. 118 Additionally, in light of the neutrality principle, the Court must refrain from making biased or generalizing statements about the applicant's religious conviction or practice. In the past, the Court has made a number of problematic statements such as "the rites and rituals of many religions may harm believers' well-being, such as, for example, the practice of fasting, which is particularly long and strict in Orthodox Christianity, or circumcision practiced on Jewish or Muslim male babies" 119 or "wearing the Islamic headscarf could not easily be reconciled with the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society should convey to their pupils" 120 . Such statements in fact contradict the ruling that "(T)the right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the Convention excludes any discretion on the part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs are legitimate." 121 122 In addition, such statements are stigmatizing 123 and disrespect the plurality of meanings a certain religious expression can have 124 as well as individual autonomy to choose what meaning to attach to a certain religious expression. 125 Instead of taking part in the political debate about the meaning society imposes on the face veil the Court has with SAS v. France the opportunity to break the circle of prejudice and return to the essence of the issue at stake, namely the rights of the women concerned and their right to freedom of religion in particular. 126 
b) Recognizing the Weight of the Applicant's Right
In the domestic debates surrounding the face veil bans the impact of the bans on freedom of religion was hardly put on the table. It is the Court's task to redress procedural justice by considering the voice of all parties and by genuinely weighing the arguments against each other as prescribed by the second paragraph of article 9 ECHR. 127 Procedural fairness requires moreover that this balancing exercise is done in a transparent manner, clarifying the weight given to each argument, as well as the underlying reason. Unfortunately the Court's adjudication in article 9 cases has often lacked clarity and consistency, in contrast with its case law under other provisions, such as freedom of expression. 128 From a procedural fairness perspective, the Court should be careful not to create the believers and their conception of life", 130 in practice, the reasoning adopted in freedom of religion cases often shows a less understanding approach, especially when the individual aspect of the right is concerned. 131 The Court's case law in the headscarf cases is well known for its one-sided approach, heavily relying on principles put forward by the State such as secularism and neutrality. 132 But also in other cases concerning religious accommodation claims the Court has often shown a lack of understanding of the importance of religious claims for applicants in a particular situation. 133 In
Francesco Sessa v. Italy 134 for example, the Court stated that a lawyer complaining about the scheduling of a hearing on a Jewish holiday, should arrange for replacement by a colleague if his religious and professional duties enter into conflict. 135 It did not seriously consider the possibility that the organization of the judicial system might accommodate respect for his religious duties. In other cases, such as the cases concerning security measures in public buildings -requiring taking off religious dress -, the Court simply refers to the importance of security measures, omitting to examine the necessity of the measure for security. 136 This insensitive approach towards religious claims should be avoided by carefully considering the concerns of the applicant and by genuinely and thoroughly balancing the interests at stake. Good practices can be found in the cases, rare in their All these factors point at the particular vulnerable position of women wearing the face veil in France.
In addition to close attention to neutrality and balancing in the Court's reasoning, they mandate specific care with respect to its discourse. Respect should characterize the way the Court talks about women wearing the face veil, and all forms of paternalism and 'othering' should be avoided.
Concluding Remarks
Procedural fairness is an important and useful concept for all types of situations in which individuals encounter the law. Its particular strength lies in its empirical basis in social psychology research, demonstrating the importance of procedural fairness for the legitimacy of legal authorities as well as for individual wellbeing. There are good reasons to state that procedural fairness merits particular attention in cases of minority justice. Moreover, it may be argued that best practice of procedural fairness is of particular importance when fundamental rights are at stake.
Our examination of the far-reaching procedural fairness flaws in the parliamentary and judicial treatment of the Belgian and French face veil bans has shown that disregard of procedural fairness makes for bad and harmful law. It is bad law, because it is not fit to address real problems: lack of attention to participation, accuracy and neutrality have led to crucial errors in the identification of problems as well as remedies. It is moreover harmful law, because it results in stigmatization and violations of the very rights it proclaims to protect.
The European Court of Human Rights is well placed to lead the way toward procedural fairness as a necessary twin of substantive fairness in human rights adjudication. While the Court's case-law shows a number of instances in which it has violated crucial procedural fairness principles, it also shows a potential to play a role in both reviewing domestic procedural justice and leading through example. The upcoming face veil case of SAS v France will be an excellent opportunity for the Court to show both its willingness and its capacity to do so.
